30 March 2005

The Honorable Paul Wolfowitz
Deputy Secretary of Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1010

Dear Dr. Wolfowitz,
Recently you have received a number of letters regarding a lack of confidence in Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jerry Jennings. Those letters were from the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, the National Alliance of Families for the Return of Americas Missing Servicemen, the Korean/Cold War Families of the Missing and a handful of family members and concerned citizens involved in the POW/MIA issue.

As of this writing, the membership of the National League of Families has not been apprized of difficulties between the League Board of Directors/Executive Director and DASD Jennings/DPMO. As a matter of fact, the membership has not received a newsletter or any other form or correspondence regarding this or any other matter from the Executive Director and/or the Leagues Board of Directors since prior to last Junes annual meeting.

Understand clearly that the Leagues Board of Directors and Executive Director issued that No Confidence vote in the name of the League without consulting its membership first. Since this situation directly affects each one of us, we have the right and responsibility to participate in the decision-making process, and to register our votes before such a position is taken in our name. Likewise, in regard to such important matters, the Board and Executive Director do not have the authority to speak for the membership without consulting us first.

In addition to our leadership positions in Task Force Omega, Inc., we are longstanding League members with our family being founding, charter and very active members of it. And because of this involvement, we have an obligation to correct several misconceptions presented to you in those letters. It is our firm belief because of the arrogance and lack of cooperation by the Leagues Board and Executive Director, DASD Jennings was forced to take charge the government briefings that will take place at the Double Tree instead of the Hilton where the League meeting will be held.

From the letters we have read and the information provided to us through other organizations, it is apparent the League leaderships dissatisfaction with Mr. Jennings is in direct proportion to his successes.

For example, DPMO has grown into a strong and viable force coordinating all aspects of the governments efforts regarding this issue. Ironically, before its inception, there was very little to no coordinated effort being made to find and recover POW/MIAs from other wars. Certainly over the years Congress held a few hearings on behalf of our missing countrymen, but nothing of substance was accomplished. Today there is an active and viable world-wide effort that is successfully working at least on the remains recovery side of the issue.

Just a cursory look at the recovery effort shows that JPAC teams are conducting operations in countries that a few short years ago we could only dream of going into. North Korea, Eastern Europe, and the area of China known as The Hump come immediately to mind. We understand that recently an agreement has been signed with Burma that will allow our teams to conduct field operations there in the near future. Likewise, when it comes to Vietnam, progress has been made for JPAC teams to enter the Central Highlands, an area where a large number of Americans vanished and one where our teams were unable to enter until now. These are truly landmark events achieved due to the efforts of DASD Jennings.

Much has been said about the recently released Gulag Study. It is an amazing report that documents the fact that over many years American POWs were transported to the former Soviet Union. The reality is some of those Americans are undoubtedly still alive and in one form of captivity or another. Further, the Gulag Study is a testament to DASD Jennings effectiveness since it was generated by members of the Joint Commission under his command.

Our President has the responsibility to protect and defend all of us, particularly those citizens who remain unaccounted for. It is his responsibility to define the return/recovery mission, then authorize and direct each department and agency to carry out his orders as quickly as possible. The responsibility of the private sector is to support our governments efforts and not to become involved in its application. In other words, the private sector is a support element. Government agencies, not private sector organizations, have the sole responsibility to carry out the Presidents directives.

The League leadership has lost sight of their position in the overall POW/MIA issue, particularly in relationship to those government agencies responsible for it. We believe this situation is due in part to how the League was founded. Before the end of the war, our government used the families to counter the Communists exploitation of our POWs. To that end the USG assisted the families in the formation of the League as well as providing financial, technical and advisory assistance to it. Likewise, for a period of time after the Peace Accords went into affect, government personnel continued to advise the League in order to control the organization and its members. Dr. Wolfowitz, we are not telling you anything you dont already know since you were personally involved during those years.

The reality is a power struggle developed over who would controlthe government briefings during the 2004 League meeting. In years past it behooved USG personnel to defer to the wishes of the Leagues Executive Director. After all, by doing so it took the burden of responsibility for conducting their portion of the program off their shoulders. Today it is a much different matter. Mr. Jennings made it clear that because family members were flown in to Washington under COIN Assist for government briefings, it was his responsibility to handle their presentations including the introduction of speakers. In spite of what the League leadership wants, the fact of the matter is DASD Jennings has the responsibility and authority to conduct all aspects of their briefings during the League meeting in the same manner he and/or his staff conduct the highly successful regional DPMO Family Updates.

Throughout the 2004 meeting the outright hostility exhibited by the Executive Director toward DASD Jennings was unmistakable. At one point on Friday during a short break, we talked with Ann Griffiths outside the meeting room. When asked what was going on, she launched into a loud and angry tirade against DASD Jennings ending with her calling him a Son-of-a-Bitch. Since there was a large group of people milling around within earshot, we viewed her comments as being highly unprofessional as well as terribly insulting.

DASD Jennings is one of the very few people in or out of government service who has refused to capitulate to the Leagues Executive Director and her desire to dominate every aspect of this issue. The League has been an important factor in bringing the POW/MIA issue to where it is today. It has an important function in the future; however, not in the direction the current leadership is taking it.

For years Ann Griffiths has manipulated the political system. This situation developed in November 1979 as a result of her signing a DIA Secrecy Agreement. We strongly recommend you reread Colonel Millard A. Pecks letter of resignation dated 12 February 1991, for his accurate evaluation of Ann Griffiths and her DIA related activities. A copy of that letter is attached for your convenience. Further, due to the nature of that agreement and the fact that no background investigation was ever conducted on her, we recommend you authorize an investigation today to determine its legality.

No, Dr. Wolfowitz, we do not like this situation one little bit. It interferes with our meetings, imposes hardships on all participants no matter what their age, and limits the amount of quality time we have with each other. However, we are observant enough, and experienced enough, to understand what is really going on here. In her/their arrogance, the Executive Director and the Board of Directors are attempting to force her/their will upon DASD Jennings and the United States Government to force him/it to conform to their desires. This is tantamount to the tail wagging the dog.

It is our considered opinion that the Leagues Board and Executive Director have lost sight of the fact that the League is a civilian organization that exists only to serve Vietnam era POW/MIA families and the men they represent, and is not the all-mighty overseer of this issue that must put its stamp of approval on every aspect of it.

In evaluating the current power struggle between the League leadership and DASD Jennings, we feel that Ann Griffiths ultimate goal is not only to get rid of Mr. Jennings, but to replace DPMO with the old Interagency Group that she so capably manipulated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Quite frankly, Dr. Wolfowitz, if that happened, it would not be constructive for the issue no matter how you look at it. As active League members, we are appalled by this entire situation which we believe has been orchestrated by the Leagues Executive Director to meet her own agenda.

If you have any questions, feel free to contact us at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Colonel Earl P. Hopper, Sr. and Patricia B. Hopper
Father and Step-Mother of Lt. Col. Earl P. Hopper, Jr., USAF, 10 January 1968, North Vietnam

1. PURPOSE: I, herby, request to resign my position as Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (POW-MIA).

2. BACKGROUND:

a. Motivation. My initial acceptance of this posting was base upon two motives: first, I had heard that the job was highly contentious and extremely frustrating, that no one would volunteer for it because of its complex political nature. This, of course, made it appear challenging. Secondly, since the end of the Vietnam War, I had heard the persistent rumors of American Servicemen having been abandoned in Indochina, and that the Government was conducting a "cover-up" so as not to be embarrassed. I was curious about this and thought that serving as the Chief of POW-MIA would be an opportunity to satisfy my own interest and help clear the Government's name.

b. The Office's Reputation. It was interesting that my previous exposure to the POW-MIA Office, while assigned to DIA, both as a Duty Director for Intelligence (DDI) and as the Chief of the Asia Division for Current Intelligence (JSI-3), was negative. DIA personnel, who worked for me, when dealing with or mentioning the Office, always spoke about it in deprecating tomes, alluding to the fact that any report which found its way there would quickly disappear into a "black hole."

c. General Attitudes. Additionally, surveys of active duty military personnel indicated that a high percentage (83%) believed that there were still live American prisoners in Vietnam. This idea was further promulgated in a number of legitimate veteran's periodicals and professional journals, as well as the media in general, which held that where there was so much smoke, there must be fire.

d. Cover-up. The dark side of the issue was particularly unsettling because of the persistent rumors and innuendoes of a Government conspiracy, alleging that U.S. military personnel had been left behind to the victorious communist governments in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and that for "political reasons" or running the risk of a second Vietnam War, their existence was officially denied. Worse yet was the implication that DIA's Special Office for POWs and MIAs was an integral part of this effort to cover the entire affair up so as not to embarrass the Government nor the Defense Establishment.

e. The Crusade. As a Vietnam veteran with a certain amount of experience in Indochina, I was interested in the entire POW-MIA question, and willingly volunteered for the job, viewing it as sort of a holy crusade.

f. The Harsh Reality. Heading up the Office has not been pleasant. My plan was to be totally honest and forthcoming on the entire issue and aggressively pursue innovative actions and concepts to clear up the live sighting business, thereby refurbishing the image and honor of DIA. I became painfully aware, however, that I was not really in charge of my own office, but was merely a figurehead or whipping boy for a larger and totally Machiavellian group of players outside of DIA. What I witnessed during my tenure as the cardboard cut-out "Chief" of POW-MIA could be euphemistically labeled as disillusioning.

3. CURRENT IMPRESSIONS, BASED ON MY EXPERIENCE:

a. Highest National Priority. That National leaders continue to address the prisoner of war and missing in action issue as the "highest national priority" is a travesty. From my vantage point, I observed that the principal government players were interested primarily in conducting a "damage limitation exercise", and appeared to knowingly and deliberately generate an endless succession of manufactured crises and "busy work". Progress consisted in frenetic activity, with little substance and no real results.

b. The Mindset to Debunk. The mindset to "debunk" is alive and well. It is held at all levels, and continues to pervade the POW-MIA Office, which is not necessarily the fault of DIA. Practically all analysis is directed to finding fault with the source. Rarely has there been any effective, active follow through on any of the sightings, nor is there a responsive "action arm" to routinely and aggressively pursue leads. The latter was a moot point, anyway, since the Office was continuously buried in an avalanche of "ad hoc" taskings from every quarter, all of which required an immediate response. It was impossible to plan ahead or prioritize courses of action.

Any real effort to pursue live sighting reports or exercise initiatives was diminished by the plethora of "busy work" projects directed by higher authority outside of DIA. A number of these grandiose endeavors bordered on the ridiculous, and -- quite significantly -- there was never an audit trail. None of these taskings was ever requested formally. There was, and still is, a refusal by any of the players to follow normal intelligence channels in dealing with the POW-MIA Office.

c. Duty, Honor and Integrity. It appears that the entire issue is being manipulated by unscrupulous people in the Government, or associated with the Government. Some are using the issue for personal or political advantage and others use it as a forum to perform and feel important, or worse. The sad fact, however, is that this issue is being controlled and a cover-up may be in progress. The entire charade does not appear to be an honest effort, and may never have been.

d. POW-MIA Officers Abandoned. When I assumed the Office for the first time, I was somewhat amazed and greatly disturbed by the fact that I was the only military officer in an organization of more than 40 people. Since combatants of all Services were lost in Vietnam, I would have thought there would at least be a token Service representation for a matter of the "highest national priority." Since the normal mix of officers from all Services is not found in my organization it would appear that the issue, at least at the working level, has, in fact, been abandoned. Also, the horror stories of the succession of military officers at the C-5 and C-6 level who have in some manner "rocked the boat" and quickly come to grief at the hands of the Government policy makers who direct the issue, lead one to the conclusion that we are all quite expendable, so by extrapolation one simply concludes that these same bureaucrats would "sacrifice" anyone who was troublesome or contentious as including prisoners of war and missing in action. Not a comforting thought. Any military officer expected to survive in this environment would have to be myopic, an accomplished sycophant, or totally insouciant.

e. The DIA Involvement. DIA's role in the affair is truly unfortunate. The overall Agency has generally practiced a "damage limitation drill" on the issue, as well. The POW-MIA Office has been cloistered for all practical purposes and left to its own fortunes. The POW Office is the lowest level in the Government "efforts" to resolve the issue, and oddly for an intelligence organization, has become the "lightening rod" for the entire establishment to the matter. The policy people manipulating the affair have maintained their distance and remained hidden in the shadows, while using the Office as a "toxic waste dump" to bury the whole "mess" out of sight and mind to a facility with the limited access to public scrutiny. Whatever happens in this issue, DIA takes the blame, while the real players remain invisible. The fact that the POW-MIA Office is always the center of an investigation is no surprise. Many people suspect that something is rotten about the whole thing, but they cannot find an audit trail to ascribe blame, so they attack the DIA/POW-MIA "dump", simply because it has been placed in the line of fire as a cheap, expendable decoy.

f. "Suppressio Veri, Suggestio Falsi." Many of the puppet masters play a confusing, murky roles. For instance, the Director of the National League of Families occupies an interesting and questionable position in the whole process.

Although assiduously "churning" the account to give a tawdry illusion of progress, she is adamantly opposed to any initiative to actually get to the heart of the problem, and, more importantly, interferes in or actively sabotages POW-MIA analyses or investigations. She insists on rewriting or editing all significant documents produced by the Office, then touted as the DIA position. She apparently has access to top secret, codeword message traffic, for which she is supposedly not cleared, and she received it well ahead of the DIA intelligence analysts. Her influence in "jerking around" everyone and everything involved in the issue goes far beyond the "war and MIA protestor gone straight" scenario. She was brought from the "outside", into the center of the imbroglio, and then, cloaked in a mantle of sanctimony, routinely impedes real progress and insidiously "muddles up" the issue. One wonders who she really is and where she came from.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Stalled Crusade. Unfortunately, what began on such a high note never succeeded in embarking. In some respects, however, I have managed to satisfy some of my curiosity.

B. Everyone is Expendable. I have seen firsthand how ready and willing the policy people are to sacrifice or "abandon" anyone who might be perceived as a political liability. It is quick and facile, and can be easily covered.

c. High-Level Knavery. I feel strongly that this issue is being manipulated and controlled at a higher lever, not with the goal of resolving it, but more to obfuscate the question of live prisoners, and give the illusion of progress through hyperactivity.

d. "Smoke and Mirrors." From what I have witnessed, it appears that any soldier left in Vietnam, even inadvertently, was, in fact, abandoned years ago, and that the farce that is being played is no more than political legerdemain done with "smoke and mirrors", to stall the issue until it dies a natural death.

e. National League of Families. I am convinced that the Director of this organization is much more than meets the eye. As the principal actor in the grand show, she is in the perfect position to clamor for "progress", while really intentionally impeding the effort. And there are numerous examples of this. Otherwise it is inconceivable that so many bureaucrats in the "system would instantaneously do her bidding and humor her every whim.

f. DIA's Dilemma. Although greatly saddened by the role ascribed to the Defense Intelligence Agency, I feel, at least, that I am dealing with honest men and women who are generally powerless to make the system work.

My appeal and attempt to amend this role perhaps never had a chance. We all were subject to control. I particularly salute the personnel in the POW-MIA Office for their long suffering, which I regrettably was unable to change. I feel that the Agency and the Office are being used as the "fall guys" or "patsies" to cover the tracks of others.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. One Final Vietnam Casualty. So ends the war and my last grand crusade, like it actually did end, I guess. However, as they say in the Legion, "je ne regrette rien..." For all of the above, I respectfully request to be relieved of my duties as Chief of the Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

b. A Farewell to Arms. So as to avoid the annoyance of being shipped off to some remote corner, out of sight and out of the way, in my own "bamboo cage" of silence somewhere, I further request that the Defense Intelligence Agency, which I have attempted to serve loyally and with honor, assist me in being retired immediately from active military service.

MILLARD A. PECK
Colonel, Infantry
USA